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WHY ANNIE GETS TO KEEP HER GUN: AN
ANALYSIS OF FIREARM EXEMPTIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Marcia Yablon*
For much of U.S. history, the possession of a gun was
considered an indispensable part of American life. In describing
the importance of firearms, President George Washington said,
"[f]irearms stand next in importance to the Constitution itself."'
According to Washington, "[t]hey are the American people's liberty
teeth and keystone under independence ....
From the hour the
Pilgrims landed to the present day, events, occurrences, and
tendencies prove that to ensure peace, security, and happiness, the
rifle and pistol are equally indispensable."'
Today, however, the importance of individual gun ownership is
highly debatable 3 and, perhaps surprisingly, has become
increasingly problematic for America's bankruptcy courts. The
varying beliefs among bankruptcy judges regarding the importance
of personal gun ownership have resulted in widely varying rulings
concerning the exemption of firearms in bankruptcy proceedings.
• 4
Just as the right to own a gun is an issue that has split the nation,
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2004. Ms. Yablon is a law clerk for the Honorable Dolores K.
Sloviter of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. She would like to thank her bankruptcy
professor, Eric Brunstad, for his helpful suggestions regarding this Article and her father for
his inspiration and encouragement.
George Washington, speech, (Jan. 7, 1790), in BOSTON INDEP. CHRON.,Jan. 14, 1790.
Id.
See MICHAEL

BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA:

THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN

CULTURE (2002) (challenging the ideas that the United States has always been a gun-oriented

culture and that well-armed militias were essential to the Revolutionary War); James L. Pate,
Preachingfor God and Guns: Baptist-Minister Calls Self-Defense 'Sacred Right, 'WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2003, at A02; Elizabeth Mehren, Knowledge Gives These Sisters Firepower,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2003,
at 8. See generally EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE (Jens Ludwig &
Philip I. Cook eds., Brookings Institution Press 2003).
Susan Page, Worried Voters Pulled in Different Directions, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2004
("Gun ownership, abortion rights and the emerging issue of same-sex marriage split the
nation down the middle."); John Zogby, Election 2004 Polls, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan.
6, 2004 ("There is a cultural and ideological divide. There is a split on ... gun ownership.").
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the right to exempt a gun in bankruptcy proceedings is an issue that
has split the courts. Both debates reveal the nation's increasing
uncertainty regarding the place of guns in modern American
society.5 The disagreement in the bankruptcy courts reveals the
same deep cultural, geographical, and philosophical disagreements
that are dividing the country over the issue of gun possession in
general.
This Article examines the different ways in which bankruptcy
courts have treated firearms for purposes of exemptions. Part I
examines state exemption statutes and their treatment of firearms.
Part II focuses on § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") ,
which entitles debtors to avoid liens in certain exempt property.
Part III reviews how bankruptcy proceedings have been used to
effectuate other, non-bankruptcy policies and the implications of
such considerations. This Article examines bankruptcy courts'
decisions pertaining to the role of firearms in bankruptcy and
argues that in many instances, bankruptcy judges are allowing their
own views on gun possession to influence their decisions, and that
this is undesirable.
I.

STATE EXEMPTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

Although there are many policies behind the provisions of the
Code, the desire to give debtors a fresh start is considered one of
the primary goals of bankruptcy.' This goal is effectuated in two
ways. First, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, the debtor receives a
discharge of personal liability on debt. Second, although most of
the debtor's property becomes property of the bankruptcy estate,
the debtor is allowed to exempt some of his or her property from
bankruptcy proceedings. The purpose of bankruptcy discharge is to
free debtors from crushing debts, while the purpose of exemptions
is to enable debtors to retain basic necessities essential for their
' Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime
and Punishment in America, U. CHI. L. REv. 4, 32 (2004) (explaining it is only recently that the
issues surrounding gun ownership have arisen and describing the current policy debate
surrounding guns as one "largely involv[ing) exchanges of symbolic sentiment," i.e., what
different people believe guns represent).
6 I U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
' See, e.g., FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003)
("[T]he 'fresh start'.., is bankruptcy's promise .... .") (Breyer, J., dissenting); Garner v.
Garner (In reGarner), 881 F.2d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he general policy of bankruptcy
is to provide the debtor with the opportunity for a fresh start.").
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fresh start. "Without exemptions, debtors would be stripped of all
their possessions with no means to replace them. Without any
possessions, debtors would be hard pressed to live or work."8
Although having exemptions seems eminently sensible, exactly
what kinds of property should be exempt is not nearly so clear. One
commentator romantically described exempt property as the "stuff
dreams are made of, without which the light of any human spirit
must inevitably flicker out."9 More commonly, exempt property is
defined as those goods necessary for "the debtor's physical survival;.
. and the debtor's ability to provide for herself and her dependants
so that they do not become public charges." ° This definition has
traditionally included items such as clothing, bedding, cookware,
dishes, and stoves." However, and much as has been written about
items.
such obviously essential
this, 2 exemptions are not confined to
14
515 musical
4
for
six
months,
bicycles,
fuel
For example, typewriters,
instruments,' 6 family portraits," one horse,"' and wedding rings ' are
all considered exempt by various states.
Although § 522 outlines a list of federal exemptions,20 most
states have chosen to opt out of the federal exemptions and replace
The continued use of state
them with state exemptions. 21
9 Michael Hillinger, How Fresh a Start?: What Are "Household Goods"for Purposes of Section
522()(1)(B)(i) Lien Avoidance?, 15 BANKR. DEV.J. 1, 6 (1998).
9 David Gray Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property: Their Fate in Bankruptcy, 2 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 247, 248 (1993).

10 Hillinger, supra note 8, at 7.
I /d.
Q See, e.g., Lowell Bottrell, Comfortable Beds, a Church Pew, a Cemetery Lot, One Hog, One Pig,
Six Sheep, One Cow, a Yolk of Oxen or a House, and Your Notary Seal: Some Thoughts About
Exemptions, 72 N.D. L. REV. 83 (1996); Douglas Deutsch, Exemption Reform: Examining the
Proposals, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 207 (1995); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the
Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235 (1995).
" ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1130 (West 2002).
14

Id.

MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023 (West 1987).
,6 MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609(1)(b) (2002).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (A) (4) (b) (West 2002).
See In re Freelander, 93 B.R. 446, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Va 1998) (allowing debtors to
exempt their thoroughbred race horse).
'9

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-105 (Michie 2002).

See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1)-(11) (2000).
Id. § 522(b) (1) (describing exempt property as "property that is specified under
subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under
paragraph (2) (A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize").
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exemptions explains why the catalog of exempt property is so vast
and colorful. Under the Code's opt out provision, states are free to
"opt out" of the federal exemptions and decide for themselves what
property should be exempt from bankruptcy proceedings. The
result is a list of exempt property that in most cases contains far
more than what would traditionally be considered the bare
necessities of life.22 In addition, many states require exemption
statutes be construed liberally, 5 which has even further increased
the uncertainty surrounding the boundaries of exempt property. As
a consequence, what property may be exempted and in what
circumstances is a highly contested issue and has been the subject of
much litigation, 4 but it is the exemption of firearms that has
recently resulted in some of the biggest disagreements. The issue of
firearm exemptions has caused severe splits between the circuits,
25
within the circuits, and even among individual districts.
The disagreement stems in part from the fact that state
exemption of firearms is done in a variety of ways, which range from
explicit statutory exemptions-employing terms such as "firearms,"
"shotgun," or "pistol"-to broad exemptions for "household goods
and furnishings." In addition, some of these exemptions have
monetary caps while others are unlimited exemptions. About
fifteen percent of states specifically exempt firearms in their state
exemption statutes. For example, in Arizona, debtors are allowed to
exempt "one shotgun or rifle or one pistol, not in excess of an

"

There have been exceptions to this over-breadth.

For example, until 1975,

Massachusetts allowed debtors to keep no more than one bed for every two members of a
household. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34 (repealed 1975).
2
In re Rhines, 227 B.R. 308, 310 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) ("like the State of
Washington, Montana has a policy of liberal construction of its exemption statutes in favor of
the exemption claimant.") (citations omitted).
" E.g., In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987) (A baler was a "hay loader" and a
haybine was a "mower" within the meaning of the Wlsconsin statute exempting such items
from property available to satisfy civil judgment, even though a baler and a haybine
performed extra functions which the obsolete implements named in the statute had not
performed.); In re Tiberia, 227 B.R. 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding engagement ring
that debtor-wife had received from her husband before they were married, at ceremony at
which other rings were exchanged, was not a "wedding ring" and could not be claimed as
exempt pursuant to New York statute granting debtors an exemption in "wedding rings").
2
See the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for two
very different rulings on the exemptability of firearms in bankruptcy proceedings. In re
Oglesby, 98 B.R. 960 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.1989) (holding firearms are not exempt property); In re
Ray, 83 B.R. 670,673 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.1988) (holding guns are exempt property).
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aggregate fair market value of five hundred dollars. 2 6 In Idaho,
debtors may exempt "furniture and appliances reasonably necessary
one household, including one

for

firearm."2

7

Iowa has an

exemption for "[o]ne shotgun and either one rifle or one musket." 2s
Montana has an exemption "to the extent of a value not exceeding
six hundred dollars" for "firearms and other sporting goods." 9
Oklahoma exempts "one gun, that is held primarily for the
personal, family or household use [of the debtor]." Oregon's gun
exemption states:
Every citizen of this state above the age of 16 years shall be entitled to
have, hold and keep, for the... use and defense of the citizen and
shall have exempt from execution one rifle or shotgun and one
pistol. The combined value of all firearms claimed as exempt under
this section may not exceed $1,000.30
31
In Texas, a debtor is allowed to exempt "two firearms.
Although these statutes all explicitly exempt guns, it is
interesting to note the varying language used to effectuate this
exemption and how it reflects a very specific view regarding the role
of guns. For example, the Montana exemption statute groups guns
with other sporting goods, seemingly indicating ajudgment that the
importance of guns is in their recreational value." Idaho and
Wisconsin both group guns among a list of other household goods,
but do not afford any special significance to firearms as opposed to
other exempt household goods. 3 In contrast, in the Oklahoma
statute, the firearm exemption is separate from exemptions for
other household goods, thereby implying a certain importance to

16
17

ARIZ. REV.STAT. ANN. §33-1125(7) (West 2002).
IDAHO CODE § 11-605 (1) (a) (Michie 2000).
IOWA CODEANN.

§ 627.6(2) (West 2002).
§ 25-13-609(1) (b) (2002).

MONT. CODEANN.

OR. REV. STAT. § 18.362 (2003).
3' TEX.PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(7) (Vernon 2001).
2
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-609(1) (b) (2002) (exempting "household furnishings and
goods, appliances, jewelry, wearing apparel, books, firearms and other sporting goods,
animals, feed, crops, and musical instruments").
" Wis. STAT. § 815.18(d) (2005) (exempting "household goods and furnishings,
wearing apparel, keepsakes, jewelry and other articles of personal adornment, appliances,
books, musical instruments, firearms, sporting goods, animals or other tangible personal
property").
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guns separate from other types of household goods.34 However, the
Oregon statute is particularly interesting. Unlike the other gun
exemptions, which are either listed under "personal property
exemptions" or "general exemptions," Oregon has a separate
"exemption for firearms" statute and the Oregon exemption is
hundreds of dollars higher than any of the other statutes listing
monetary caps.35 More telling is the fact that the firearm exemption
is couched in Second Amendment type rhetoric. The statute is
worded such that an exemption for firearms appears to follow
almost as a corollary from a citizen's right to bear arms, making it
appear that a firearms exemption is a similar "right."
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts in states with explicit
exemption statutes often tend to construe these statutes liberally in
favor of debtors retaining their guns. Court opinions in these states
appear to reflect less ambivalence regarding gun ownership than
states without explicit exemptions. For example, the Idaho case law
concerning gun exemptions has frequently focused on the
"reasonably necessary" clause of the statute and the courts'
interpretation of this clause has been quite lenient, revealing a
belief that guns are reasonably necessary for many people. Such
sentiments are apparent in In re Biancavilla,in which a husband and
wife, filing for chapter 7 relief together, 6 each wanted to claim a
gun exemption. s7 The bankruptcy trustee objected and argued the
debtors could only exempt one gun in total.3 8 The court, however,
disagreed with the trustee and held the statute allowed the
exemption of one firearm per debtor, thereby holding that two guns
could be reasonably necessary to a household.39 In addition, even
For example, Oklahoma Statute Annotated title 31, section l(A)3 (West 2005),
exempts other types of household goods and furnishings, including "[a]ll household and
kitchen furniture held primarily for the personal, family or household use of such person or a
dependent of such person," section 1(A)7 exempts "[a]ll books, portraits and pictures that
are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of
such person," and section 1(A)8 exempts "[t]he person's interest, not to exceed Four
Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) in aggregate value, in wearing apparel that is held primarily for
the personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of such person."
'
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.362 (2003).
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a liquidation. EEOC v. Apria Healthcare Group, 222 F.R.D.
608, 612 (E.D. Mo. 1994) ("A Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding is a liquidation bankruptcy in
which the debtor's assets are collected in an estate and distributed by a trustee to the
creditors.").
57
173 BR 930 (1994).
Id. at 933.
Id.
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though some Idaho bankruptcy courts have disagreed with the
second gun exemption in Biancavilla,these courts have nonetheless
agreed the "'reasonableness' showing for the first firearm is
minimal. "4

Similarly, in Iowa, the gun exemption is also strongly protected
by the courts, even in situations where the exemption seems to be a
clear abuse of the statute's purpose. In In re McCabe, debtors
claimed a $10,320 shotgun, bought on the eve of their bankruptcy
filing, as exempt, and the court upheld the exemption. 41 The
McCabe court was unwilling to impose any restrictions or
qualifications on the statute's firearm exemption. Similarly, in In
re Eichelberger, another Iowa bankruptcy court held a $22,000
Winchester rifle, also bought on the eve of bankruptcy, was exempt
and held "the rifle is clearly an item of exempt property under the
Iowa Exemption Statute .... "143
In cases like McCabe and Eichelberger, the Iowa courts
demonstrated a patent refusal to view large monetary exemptions
for guns as different from other large expenditures on exempt
property. In McCabe, the court compared the gun exemption cases
to other Iowa bankruptcy cases in which courts had upheld large
monetary exemptions for life insurance, 44 mortgage payments, 5 and
the purchase of the debtors' homestead.' Although the McCabe
court agreed that it was bound to "apply the statute in a manner
consistent with its purpose,4 7 the court found an exemption for a
$10,000 gun was consistent with the statute's purpose, which it
described as "a policy decision by the Iowa legislature to exempt
items which provide the debtor with the necessities for living."'
This deferential treatment of firearms in bankruptcy, by courts
located in states that provide explicit firearms exemptions, stands in

4' See, e.g., In re Mansfield, No. 98-03309, 1999 WL 33486715, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho
Mar. 2, 1999) (citations omitted).
41 280 B.R. 841, 844 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002).
42 See id. at 846.

'

Id. at 845 (citing In re Eichelberger, No. L-89-0013W, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept.

29, 1989)).
In re McCabe, 280 B.R. at 845 (citing In re Breuer, 68 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa

1986)).
Id. (citing Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank, 848 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir.1998)).
Id. (citing In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 271, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.
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stark contrast to states that do not explicitly exempt firearms, but
instead have broad exemption provisions that could be interpreted
to include firearms. As noted above, in states with explicit firearm
exemptions, courts have been fairly consistent and uniform in their
interpretation and application of these exemptions. 49 Conversely, in
states that have exemptions for items which fall within the
amorphous term "household goods," court opinions vary
significantly over the question of whether firearms qualify as exempt
property. ° These later opinions reveal wide disagreement over the
importance of guns and strongly reflect conflicting beliefs over the
need or usefulness of personal firearms. A comparison of the
Nebraska case, In re Karaus," the South Carolina case, In re Stroman,52
and the Colorado case, In re Greenlee," illustrates this difference.
In all three states, the statutes under which the debtors claimed
an exemption for their firearms were nearly identical. Although
none of the statues had a specific firearm exemption, all three
provided exemptions for "household goods." The Nebraska statute
provides an exemption for
the debtor's interest, not to exceed an aggregate fair market value of
one thousand five hundred dollars, in household furnishings,
household goods, household computers, household appliances,
books, or musical instruments which are held primarily for personal,
family, 54
or household use of such debtor or the dependents of such
debtor.
The South Carolina statute exempts "[t]he debtor's interest, not to
exceed two thousand five hundred dollars in aggregate value in
household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are
held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor, " 5 and the Colorado statute
provides an exemption for "[tihe household goods owned and used

49 See supranotes 37, 41, 43.
'0
"

52
"

15

See infra notes 51-53, 58-75 and accompanying text.
276 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2002).
78 BR 785 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987).
61 B.R, 257 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1556 (2001).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(3) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
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by the debtor and used by his dependants to the extent of fifteen
hundred dollars in value."56
The difference in outcomes is obviously not based on wording
differences; all three statutes exempt household goods owned and
used by the debtor and his or her family. However, the three courts
reached very different conclusions regarding the exemption of
firearms as household goods. As these opinions demonstrate, such
differences seem to be based on significant differences in the
courts' views regarding the importance and role of firearms in day
to day living. 57
The Karaus court defined household goods as goods that
"facilitate day-to-day living. . .. "58 For the Karaus court, guns
facilitated this purpose because of the protection they provided to
the debtor and his family.59 The court found it significant that the
debtor considered his "two weapons to be part of his household
goods in that he keeps them in his household at all times for selfdefense if that should become necessary.""° The court accepted
without question the debtor's contention that he needed his guns
for protection and did not require any specific showing that the
debtor faced more significant threats to his security than the regular
possibility of crime faced by all Americans. The court held "the
[d]ebtor's 12-gauge shotgun and .45-caliber pistol are used to
protect the home .... Therefore, those two firearms are deemed to
be 'household goods' and are exempt .... ,61
In Stroman, the court defined household goods as goods
"necessary to afford the debtors a reasonably comfortable
existence., 62 Although this definition of household goods appears
broader than the Karauscourt's requirement that such goods must
"facilitate daily living,, 63 the Stroman court held the debtor's firearms
did not qualify for an exemption. 64 The difference seems to be that
the Stroman court viewed guns as luxury items.65 Although the
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-54-102(e) (West 2003).

57 See supra notes 53-55.

In re Kraus, 276 B.R. 227, 231 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2002).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 228.
61

Id. at 231.

62 78 B.R. 785, 786 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987).

0

276 B.R- at 231.
78 B.R. at 787.
The court viewed guns as akin to VCRs, which it also rejected as non-exempt

562
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Stroman opinion is regrettably short, the court's views on guns can
be gleaned from its comparison of guns to VCRs, which the court
also held should not be exempt, and its citation to In re Shaffer."
Shaffer concerned the exemption of a sterling silver flatware set.
The Shaffer court held the silver was not a luxury item and was
exempt because it was "used by the debtors in their personal and
business dining and entertainment of guests in [their] home."6'7
The citation to Shaffer in the Stroman opinion is telling because it
seems to indicate the Stroman court's belief that sterling silver
flatware, considered by many to be a classic luxury item, constitutes
a good significantly more practical and useful than guns.68
In Greenlee, the Colorado bankruptcy court defined household
goods69 in a way that was much narrower than either the Nebraska
or South Carolina bankruptcy courts' interpretation of their states'
similar provision. The Greenlee court defined household goods as
property "of such character that without it, the debtor will not be
able to support himself or his family nor will he be able to get a
'fresh start."'7 ° The debtors in Greenlee claimed an exemption for
"guns... used for hunting to provide food for the debtors."7
Although it was "not disputed that the debtors employ the guns for
hunting and eat the game they kill," the court refused to exempt the
guns because the debtors had not shown they would be "unable to
support and feed themselves without hunting."72 The standard set
by the Greenlee court was one that perhaps Davy Crocket could have
met, but that few modern day Americans would ever be able to
household goods and as less necessary than sterling silver flatware, which was held to be a
necessary household good in In re Shaffer, 78 B.R. 783 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987), a case the Stroman
court cited approvingly. In re Stroman, 78 B.R. at 787.
78 B.R. 783.
67 Id. at 785.
In addition, the Stroman court may have cited Shaffer for the Shaffer court's reference
to In re Young, Case No. 85-02371 (Bankr. D.S.C. Feb. 3, 1986); although if the court had
wanted to cite to Young it would have made more sense to do so directly. In re Young was
another South Carolina bankruptcy case in which the court held that a twelve gauge shotgun
did not constitute a household good. Id. However, that case was based on an interpretation
of the lien avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and not on the South Carolina
exemption statute. Id. Therefore, the decision in Youngwas not controlling and served little
more than as an example of how the word "household" could be interpreted and had no
precedential value for how the term in the South Carolina statute should be interpreted.
In reGreenlee, 61 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
70 Id. at 258.
71 Id.
n

Id.
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satisfy, which seems to have been the court's purpose. The Greenlee
court appeared to view the idea that guns are necessary for day to
day living as an antiquated idea belonging to a different era.73 For
the Greenlee court, "guns [were] primarily recreational
items, not
74
property essential to the debtor's 'fresh start.'
While these different views on the role and importance of guns
in daily life is interesting, the fact that states differ in their
exemption statutes over the significance of firearms may not seem
incredibly problematic. State laws vary significantly on a whole host
of issues; however, the problem arises because these conflicting
views on firearm exemptions affect how courts have interpreted
other § 522 provisions. As a result, bankruptcy courts are making
inconsistent determinations regarding the exemption of firearms
for the purposes of § 522. 75 Although there is no problem when
state law differs between states, as arguably, this is one of the
benefits of federalism, there is a problem when federal law is
similarly variable.
II. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE'S LIEN AVOIDANCE PROVISION

Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
"establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." 76 In
interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court explained in Railway
Labor Executives' Association v. Gibbons that "one principal purpose
was to avoid conflict between state laws concerning debtor
insolvency," and that this is accomplished "by uniform interstate
application of federal bankruptcy laws under the Supremacy
Clause." 77 Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Blanchette v. Connecticut
General Insurance Corp., explained: 'The Constitutional requirement
of uniformity is a requirement of geographic uniformity. It is wholly
satisfied when existing obligations of a debtor are treated alike by
the bankruptcy administration throughout the country regardless of
" Such a view is stated explicitly in In re Brown in which the court stated, "ownership of
arms for hunting purposes, in this day and time, begets hunting clothes, hunting licenses,
hunting vehicles, hunting outings, etc. etc., all of which, it is thought, involve expenditures of
money that could hardly be classified as necessary." 189 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1995).
74 61 B.R. at 258.
See II U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
76

§ 8, cl.4.
455 U.S. 457,474 (1982).
U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
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However, in spite of

the fact the Supreme Court has consistently stated that bankruptcy
laws should be uniform, the current treatment of the Code's lien
avoidance provision" with regard to firearms fails this uniformity
requirement. Similarly situated debtors attempting to avoid liens on
their firearms are given very different treatment depending on
which bankruptcy court hears their case.
This varying treatment is especially worrisome given that lien
avoidance is an incredibly important tool in enabling a debtor to
achieve a fresh start after bankruptcy. In 1970, Congress created the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to reexamine the Bankruptcy Act.80 After much study, the Commission
determined that the existence of security interests in essential
property was one of the major factors "undermin[ing] the debtor's
fresh start," because these interests "were forcing debtors to reaffirm
debts to keep 'essential property."'8 1 According to the Commission,
the problem was that when a creditor had a security interest in the
debtor's exempt property, he could enforce it regardless of the
property's exempt status and in spite of the debtor's receiving a
general discharge of his debts.8 According to the Commission, the
frequent result of this situation was that the effect of the debtor's
discharge in bankruptcy was often "neutralized by the secured
creditor's act in obtaining a reaffirmation of the entire debt under a
threat to repossess the collateral."'8
Recognizing this threat, Congress enacted § 522 (f), which seeks
to "protect the debtor's existing exemptions, the debtor's discharge,
and thus, the debtor's fresh start. It does so by permitting debtors
to avoid certain liens and security interests in exempt property.8 4 In
enacting this provision, Congress recognized the importance of lien
avoidance in bankruptcy and the fact that liens in certain types of
property may undermine a debtor's fresh start.
However,
78 419 U.S. 102, 180 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1946) (Frankfurter,J., concurring)).
S11 U.S.C. § 522.
Hillinger, supra note 8, at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13; see Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 3-4
(1973).
"
Hillinger, supra note 8, at 13 (quoting Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report, H.R_
Doc. No. 93-137).

84

Id. at 18.
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Congress's solution to one problem wound up creating another
one. Congress only broadly defined the types of property that fit
the definition of "essential property."8 5 As a result, there has been a
widely divergent application of § 522(f) which has, in certain
instances, resulted in courts letting their own values determine
whether a debtor will be able to avoid a lien on his exempt
property.8 6 This tendency of bankruptcy courts to let personal
beliefs influence bankruptcy decisions is especially pronounced in
situations when bankruptcy courts are faced with the task of
applying the lien avoidance provision to firearms.
The problems come from the vagueness of § 522 (f) (1) (B) (i),
which states:
[A] debtor may avoid.., a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest [to the extent it impairs an exemption in] household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily
for the personal, family , or household use of the debtor or a
dependant of the debtor.'
Specifically, it is the meaning of the term "household goods," which
one commentator

dubbed

"the $64,000

question,'88 that has

generated the most disagreement. The Code does not provide a
definition of household goods, and the Code's legislative history is
equally unilluminating. The House Report explains this term by
stating § 522(f) will enable the debtor to avoid judicial liens and
non-purchase money security interests that impair "most other
personal effects." 9 Unfortunately, this term is at least as imprecise
and perhaps even broader than "household goods." The Senate
Report simply summarizes § 522(f) without providing any
explanation or analysis. 0
As a result of such a lack of congressional guidance, courts have
employed a variety of different tests for determining what items
qualify as household goods. These tests range from the very narrow
" Id. at 52 ("Congress did not tinker at all with the language... [rather, Congress
enacted into law the very same language" that had been problematic in the first place.)
Id. at 53.
87

11 U.S.C. §522(f)(1)(B)(i) (2000).

Hillinger, supra note 8, at 24.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 127-28 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6088-89.
'o S. REP. No.95-989, at 76 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5862.
"
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FTC definition of household goods, 9 a definition only six published
opinions have ever considered using,2 to a test defining household
goods as any goods located within the house.93 With such a range of
tests, the definition of household goods frequently becomes
whatever an individual court or judge thinks it should be. In
particular, cases concerning the avoidance of liens on firearms have
demonstrated not only how malleable this definition is, but also the
danger in leaving it so vague. Such a fuzzy term provides a ready
screen from behind which judges can apply their own personal
beliefs and sense of morality to their supposedly impartial
bankruptcy determinations.
The fact that courts have addressed the issue, for no reason
other than what seems to be a desire to voice their views on gun
possession, demonstrates this danger.
In In re Brown, a case
concerning Louisiana's exemption for "arms and military
accoutrements" 94 as opposed to the applicability of § 522(f), the
court nonetheless addressed the meaning of household goods, and
stated if such a case were before the court, it would "find that
firearms are not 'household goods.' 95 Although the court stated its
discussion of household goods served "merely as the last nail used in
the construction of the analytical support for the statutory
construction effort upon which the Court embarked,"9 6 the court
also wanted to voice its opinion regarding gun ownership. The
Brown court cited nine cases holding guns are not household goods
and only two cases holding they are household goods. 7 More telling
91 The FT'C defines household goods as
[c]lothing, furniture, appliances, one radio and one television, linens,
china, crockery, kitchenware and personal effects (including wedding
rings) of the consumer and his or her dependants, provided that the
following are not included within the scope of the term household goods:
(1) Works of art; (2) Electronic entertainment equipment (except one
television and one radio); (3) Items acquired as antiques; and (4) Jewelry
(except wedding rings).
16 C.F.R. § 444.1 (i) (2004).
Hillinger, supra note 8, at 33 n.131.
93 See, e.g., Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc. (In re Caruthers), 87 B.R. 723 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga.
1988); In reMiller, 65 B.R. 263, 265 66 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
189 B.R. 653,653 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1995).
9'
Id. at 675.
Id.

Id. at 675 nn.51-56. Although there are more cases holding guns are not household
goods than cases holding they are household goods, the Brown court's 9:2 ratio is not accurate
and extremely misleading.
17

20051

Why Annie Gets to Keep Her Gun

567

is the court's discussion of In re Raines, one of the two cases cited for
the holding that guns may constitute household goods. In Raines,
the court held handguns fall within a general household goods
exemption because they are "commonly used to protect the home
and its occupants [to] support and facilitate daily household
living."'5 Judge Phillips, who decided Brown, addressed the Raines
approach towards gun ownership, stating:
Notwithstanding this firmly embraced "frontiersey" approach to
defense, there is no mention in the [Raines] opinion of any evidence
that the handguns at issue had ever actually been used for defense or
that such a means of defense was actually necessary; and there
certainly is no mention of any evidence which might tend to show
that existence of handguns in the home might constitute a constraint
against daily "living," by bringing about daily dying or injury, etc.99
This statement evidences Judge Phillips's belief that the time in
which guns were necessary for protection is long past, and the
presence of guns in the home is more likely to cause death or injury
than to facilitate living. Judge Phillips's household goods discussion
was primarily a vehicle for advocating gun control. Such political
advocacy is not the role of bankruptcy judges,1 °0 and statutory
language, such as "household goods," that facilitates such judicial
partiality is problematic.
Similar pontification has been performed by other courts when
considering whether guns constitute household goods for the
purpose of lien avoidance. These courts also express more than a
simple determination as to whether guns qualify as household
goods, and their opinions typically articulate a view regarding the
role of guns in our society, including a judgment as to whether such
a role is desirable. Moreover, these opinions frequently ignore
precedent in order to reach a specific conclusion regarding gun
161 B.R. 548, 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
In re Brown, 189 B.R. at 675 n.57.
"'
It is well established judges are supposed to be impartial determiners of facts. See, e.g.,
Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 367, 368 (2002) (expressing concern that "state supreme court elections
are being transformed into purely political affairs at odds with the independent and impartial
role that judges and courts must perform under America's three-branch system of
government"); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982) (criticizing the
managerial role of judges as a form of judicial activism that threatens to redefine long held
standards of what constitutes fair and impartial adjudication).
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ownership.'O° Although courts often state their decisions are based
on a particular definition of household goods, closer examination
reveals that regardless of which definition of household goods the
court chooses to apply, the real question the courts are deciding is
whether guns serve a valuable role in modern American society.
The issue concerning lien exemptions for firearms is more
complicated than the normal debate surrounding firearm
possession because it concerns the possible indispensability of
firearms rather than their legality.'
Every bankruptcy court that
has addressed the constitutionality of exemptions for firearms has
agreed that whether the "right to bear arms" entails a right to the
personal possession of firearms has little bearing on whether
firearms are exempt in bankruptcy proceedings. In Brown, the court
found
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Louisiana Constitutions of 1879, 1898, 1913, and 1921 referred to the
collective right "to keep and bear arms" to support the militia. In
contrast, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 strengthen[ed] the
rights of individual citizens to keep and bear arms, with no reference
to a militia... [by] setting out that right in absolute terms ....
103

See, e.g., In re Oglesby, 98 B.R. 960 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989).
This debate concerns whether the second amendment confers a personal right to
bear arms. So far, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue. In Printz v. United
States, the Court stated:
[A] colorable argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at
least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul
of that Amendment's protections... however, we need not consider it here.
Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine
whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms "has
justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic."
521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997) (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890, at 746 (1833)).
The Court's most recent treatment of the second amendment occurred more than sixty
years ago in United States v. Miller, in which the Court held the second amendment did not
guarantee a citizen's right to possess a sawed-off shotgun because that weapon had not been
shown to be "ordinary military equipment.., that . . could contribute to the common
defense." 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). However, the Court did not attempt to define, or
otherwise construe, the substantive right protected by the second amendment. Id. Without
any definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, the debate over the right to personal
possession of firearms is likely to continue.
189 B.R. at 668. The issue before the court was whether this term included personal
firearms.
"o

103
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Although the Brown court found the Louisiana Constitution
guaranteed the right to personal firearms possession, the court still
held the state exemption statute only applied to firearms used for
military purposes and saw
no constitutional problem with denying
01 4
the firearm exemption.

Other courts have dismissed constitutional objections just as
easily. In In re Debias, the debtor contended his handgun was
exempt property because the Colorado Constitution guarantees the
right to bear arms.' The court responded by stating, "[t]he fact
that Colorado statutory and constitutional law may establish the
right to own and possess a handgun for personal protection is not,
however, instructive on the question of whether
a handgun ...
10 6
should be exempt from the bankruptcy estate."

The Idaho bankruptcy court in In re Mansfield was the most
explicit in rejecting this constitutional argument, explaining the
"key distinction to be drawn here is between the right to bear arms
and the ability to bear arms. "10 7 The court reasoned, "[tihe right to
bear arms has been interpreted as a constitutional guarantee for the
people, individually, to keep a gun for their security and defense.
The Idaho Constitution does not guarantee that every citizen will
have the financial ability to bear arms. " 10 8 The court further
explained that allowing the creditor to take possession of the
debtor's gun does nothing to restrict the debtor's right to bear
109
arms.
As the above cases make clear, the issue before the bankruptcy
courts is not whether a debtor has the right to bear arms, but rather,
given that firearm possession is lawful, whether firearms qualify as
household goods under § 522's lien avoidance provision. In many
instances, the bankruptcy courts' answer to this question appears to
be motivated more by political than legal considerations. However,
despite the fact that personal possession of firearms is legal in our
society, many of the courts addressing lien avoidance in firearms
seem to be addressing the question of whether gun possession
should be legal.
I

Id. at 668-69.
I0 198 F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 1999).
IN

Id.

No. 98-03309, 1999 WL 33486715, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Mar. 2, 1999).
1. Id. (citations omitted).
107

I Id. ("The debtor continues to have the right to bear arms, despite the debtor's lack of
financial ability to do so.").
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The court opinions dealing with lien avoidance in firearms are
extremely varied, but the arguments for and against gun control can
be broadly categorized as opinions either dealing with firearms used
for hunting or those concerning firearms used for protection. Two
cases falling into the former category are In re Rhines"° and McGreevy
v. ITT FinancialServices (In re McGreevy),"' both of which concerned
debtors attempting to avoid liens in hunting rifles and shotguns in
states that allowed firearm exemptions. The Rhines court held such
firearms were household goods" 2 while the McGreevy court held they
were not."1 The difference in outcome was based on the courts'
very different perceptions regarding the role of guns in modem day
American society, or what the Rhines court described as a difference
in "the cultural environment of the Debtors" and a 4difference in
"the geographic location of the Debtors' household.""

The McGreevy court believed there were few, if any,
circumstances in which a hunting shotgun could be necessary for
daily living, and noted that "[t] he vast majority of bankruptcy courts
that have addressed the issue have held, as the district court did
''
here, that firearms can never constitute household goods. 11
Conversely, the Rhines court saw the hunting rifle and shotgun,
which the debtor used to provide his family with meat for food, as
fitting the quintessential definition of a household good." 6
According to the Rhines court, "it is hard to imagine a more
'functional nexus' between a... firearm and the household that
depends upon it for food."" 7

The two courts clearly had very

different conceptions concerning the importance of hunting and
whether such a lifestyle should be protected and encouraged
8
through the applicability of the Code's lien avoidance provisions."

227 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998).
955 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1992). The debtors in McGreevy also argued their guns were
used for protection. Id.
227 B.R. at 309.
n"995 F.2d at 960.
114 In re Rhines, 227 B.R. at 310.
15
In re McGreevey, 955 F.2d at 962 n.12 (citations omitted). Although the court stated it
was "not prepared to conclude at this time that firearms per se can never be household goods,"
it supported this statement with a footnote listing over fifteen cases that had held firearms
could never constitute household goods. Id. at 962 & n.12.
"
In re Rhines, 227 B.R. at 310.
1.7 Id.
118 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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This clash of cultures can be seen in other cases addressing
whether hunting rifles meet the definition of household goods. In
In re Mason, the court made quite clear its belief that hunting rifles
used to provide meat for the debtor's family did constitute
household goods." 9 However, in In re Greenlee, the court held
hunting rifles were not household goods. 120 Although the trustee
did not dispute that the "guns [were] used for hunting to provide
food for the debtors," the court held that unless the debtors could
show they "would be unable to support or feed themselves without
hunting," the guns could not be exempted. 2' These outcomes
reflect very different views regarding the contemporary need for
guns as a means of providing sustenance and, as the Rhines court
cultural and geographical values
observed, reflect different
22
concerning hunting.

The greatest disagreement among bankruptcy courts concerns
the question of whether guns are necessary for protection. While a
number of courts have held guns support daily living by providing
protection to the debtor and his family, many other courts have
held the era in which guns were necessary for protection is long
past. As the court stated in Plummer v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp.
(In re Plummer), "[d]ecisions against the exemptibility of firearms
appear to assume that in a modern society firearms are maintained
solely for recreational purposes, such as sport shooting and
recreational hunting."2 3 The Plummer court strongly objected to this
assumption, stating, "[t]his assumption ignores other valid reasons
for the maintenance of a firearm in a household," and holding that
where a "firearm is maintained in the debtor's household for the
protection of2 4the debtors, the debtor's family and property [it] is
exemptible."

19

In re Mason, 254 B.R. 764, 772 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (noting the debtors had

"hunted every year since 1988, and his hunting is the Debtors' primary means of obtaining
meat and fowl to feed themselves and their daughter, except for an occasional chicken they
buy").
M See supra Part I for a discussion of In re Greenlee, 61 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
Although Greenlee did not involve lien avoidance like the other hunting rifle cases, the court's
decision was based on an interpretation of the term "household goods." Id. at 257.
IN Id. at 258.
I 227 B.R. 308, 310 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998).
In No. 387-00162, 1988 WL 1019659, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.July 1, 1988).
124 Id. at *7.
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Similarly, in In re Gonshorowski, the bankruptcy court found a
.22 revolver to be a household good and subject to the lien
avoidance provision of § 522(f).12
According to the court,
"[r] evolvers of this type are typically used for defense by debtors and
their dependents, particularly around the home."1 26 Furthermore,
in In re Raines, the court held the debtor's .357 Smith & Wesson
Magnum handgun was exempt because "[1]ike the revolver
described in Gonshorowski, this type of firearm typically is12used
for
7
defense purposes and protection in and around the home."
Other bankruptcy courts have balked at finding guns are typical
household items and necessary for day to day living. In In re French,
the court refused to "take judicial notice that a .38 caliber revolver is
normally found in today's average home." 28 In that case, the court

found the debtor's handgun did not "significantly support and
facilitate the debtor's day-to-day living within the home.",2 9 In
addition, the court found the debtor's sixteen-gauge shotgun, which
she said she kept for protection, could not "support and facilitate a
debtor's day-to-day living...
if she does not know how to safely or
''3
properly use the firearm.

10

Similarly, in Barnes v. HT Financial Service (In re Barnes), the
court held that "[flirearms are sporting goods normally used
outside and away from the home" and that they "are not household
goods because they are not reasonably necessary for the day to day
existence of people in the context of their homes." 13 1

In In re

Weaver, a Texas bankruptcy court held that in spite of "increasing
crime rates,"' 2 debtor's firearms did not constitute necessary
household goods. Likewise, in Noggle v. BeneficialFinancialCo. (In re
Noggle), the court found
"[a] rifle is generally not understood to be a
33
household good."

125

110 B.R. 51, 53 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990).

I2

Id.

127

161 B.R. 548,551 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).

I

177 B.R. 568, 575 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).

In
lO

Id.

Such a finding seems questionable; there is no reason an intruder facing the barrel of

a shotgun would know the debtor did not know how to use it.
131 117 B.R. 842, 847 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
132
78 B.R. 135, 139 & n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
"

30 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
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III. SHOULD BANKRUPTCY LAW BE INFLUENCED BY SOCIAL POLICY
GOALS?

The above cases demonstrate the ease with which bankruptcy
can
be used by the courts to further social policy goals even if
law
there is disagreement among the courts as to which goals should be
furthered. Although there is little debate that bankruptcy law was
created to achieve certain policy objectives, such as giving debtors a
fresh start and preventing them from becoming economic drains on
society, there has been substantial disagreement over the use of
bankruptcy law to further other types of social policies only
tangentially related to bankruptcy.'TM
One example of this is the debate surrounding the use of
bankruptcy law to advance the goal of environmental protection.
Although filing for bankruptcy normally results in a discharge of
debt, some courts have been unwilling to allow debtors to discharge
the cost of environmental clean-up. One way courts have prevented
this discharge is by expanding the special police powers exception
to the automatic stay in bankruptcy.'3 5 In employing this exception
to environmental clean-up cases, the courts are effectively granting
environmental agencies that clean up waste sites super lien priority
on the assets of the bankrupt environmental violator."6 An example
of this is the Third Circuit decision in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of
Environmental Resources, where the court used the police power
exception to the automatic stay to allow the state government to
issue an injunction against the debtor, which required it to pay the
cost of rectifying its environmental violations. 137 The Penn Terra
court was aware it was favoring environmental policies over
bankruptcy goals, but stated:

l

See supranotes 3-4.
Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states:

The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay(4) ... of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit.., to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment,
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's... police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000); see, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3rd
Cir. 1984).
13 Robert Funsten & Alejandro Hernandez, The Toxic Waste Generator in Bankruptcy:
Should EnvironmentalCleanup Costs be Given a Piority?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 120-21 (1986).
1,7
733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
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[I]n some circumstances, bankruptcy policy must yield to higher
priorities. Indeed, if the policy of preservation of the estate is to be
invariably paramount, then one could not have exceptions to the
rule. Since Congress did provide for exceptions, however, we may
assume that the goal of preserving the debtor's estate is not always the
dominant goal.'3
The Penn Terra court saw no problem in using bankruptcy law to
further environmental policy.39 However, it is unclear that the
court should have been so willing to use bankruptcy proceedings to
achieve these environmental goals, especially at the expense of
traditional
bankruptcy
objectives.1"
According
to
one
commentator, Penn Terra "is a classic case wherein a court
succumbed to an emotional argument at the expense of creditors
and the procedural integrity of the Code.",4 ' The Penn Terra court is
not alone in succumbing to these emotional arguments. In fact,
other courts have gone further than Penn Terra in holding that the
police powers exception allows claims for monetary damages in 2
addition to injunctive relief. In United States v. Mattiace Industries,'"
the government sought injunctive relief and fines for clean-up costs
from the debtor under CERCLA.14" Although the debtor argued the
government's action to recover response costs and punitive damages
was subject to the automatic stay, the Mattiace court held:
[G] overnment actions under CERCLA, whether for injunctive relief
or for recovery costs, damages, and penalties, are brought pursuant
to a statute that was clearly enacted to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public. Even where the United States seeks punitive
damages or reimbursement of Superfund cleanup costs in addition to
or in lieu of injunctive relief, thereby arguably protecting its own
pecuniary interest, the deterrence function of the relief sought will
render the action one to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare.'

Id.at 278.

'

I"/d.

0 Funsten & Hernandez, supranote 136, at 136.
Id.

141

"' 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
10 "CERCLA" stands for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1980).
"' 73 B.R. at 819 (citations omitted).
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Such decisions seem in conflict with Congressional intent and the
general goals of bankruptcy.'45 Scholars writing on this issue have
noted "courts are not well suited to the task of uniformly deciding
how to balance the competing objectives of the Bankruptcy Code
and the environmental laws" and such decisions should be left to
Congress. 146 Because Congress has not directly addressed this issue,
bankruptcy courts have had to resolve conflicts between bankruptcy
and environmental goals, often resulting in the subordination of
bankruptcy policies. 147 The repeated subordination of bankruptcy
goals raises doubts as to the suitability of courts in reconciling these
conflicts. Additionally, the frequent request from scholars to have
Congress remove such decisions from the courts' discretion further
supports the proposition that bankruptcy proceedings 48 are an
inappropriate forum to effectuate non-bankruptcy policies.
The line of cases concerning postpetition tithes provides a good
example of courts recognizing the dangers in using bankruptcy
proceedings to further non-bankruptcy policies. 49 Courts have
acknowledged the value debtors receive from religious tithes is
highly subjective; however, most courts have concluded something
'0 Jose R. Allen & Robert P. Doty, Cleaning Up In Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start or a Clean
Start?, 445 PLI/Lit 673, 675 (1992) ("[C]ourts have produced a dizzying array of opinions
when confronted with debtors burdened with environmental liabilities."); Kathryn R. Heidt,
Products Liability, Mass Torts and EnvironmentalObligations in Bankruptcy: Suggestionsfor Reform, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 117, 148 (1995) ("Any priority for environmental claims should be
explicitly set forth in the Code rather than created indirectly.");John C. Ryland, %%en Policies
Collide: The Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 739, 749
(1994) ("Allowing the enforcement of environmental judgments under the guise of the §
362(b) (4) police and regulatory power exception would thwart Congress' intent to narrowly
construe § 364(b)(4) and would result in the complete frustration of the Bankruptcy Code's
'fresh start' and 'equitable distribution' policies.").
Debra L. Baker, Bankrupty--The Last Environmental Loophoole, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 379,
'4
406 (1993).
.47Jill Thompson Losch, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the Titans, 52 LA.
L. REV. 137 ("[Ils the fresh start policy of bankruptcy to be subordinated to the concern for
the health of humans and the environment embodied in environmental regulations?").
I See, e.g., John R. Bevis, In re Jensen, Demonstratingthe Need for Supreme Court Resolution of
the Conflict Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, 9J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 201 (1993)
("Where no Congressional guidance exists regarding which of two mutually exclusive policies
is paramount, conflict is inevitable."); Patricia L. Quentel, Emerging Tensions Between CERCLA
and the Bankruptcy Code, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10268, 10268 (1993) ("[Wlith congressional
guidance, bankruptcy courts can equitably fulfill their proper role in resolving the conflicting
policies inherent in CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code.").
M9 See, e.g., Weinman v. Word of Life Christian Ctr. (In re Bloch), 207 B.R. 944, 947 (D.
Colo. 1997); Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 247 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995).
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of "reasonably equivalent value" (the test used to determine
fraudulent conveyances) is not received in exchange for tithes.' 50
These courts have rightly recognized "religious, spiritual, and
emotional value is immeasurable in economic terms" and "[i]t is
purely subjective and necessarily varies from individual to
individual."' 5' As a result, bankruptcy courts have been "loathe to
delve into the real theological basis for tithe paying" or to consider
This
the emotional benefits people receive from tithing. 5 2
reluctance is especially interesting given the fact bankruptcy courts
have been willing to consider emotional benefits in other contexts.
For example, in In re Chomakos, the court was willing to consider the
psychic entertainment value of gambling, stating Casino patrons
receive "psychic and other intangible values" from gambling. 5 3 In
tithing cases, however, courts have decided bankruptcy proceedings
are not the appropriate forum to advance non-bankruptcy goals
such as encouraging charitable contributions, and therefore, the
courts have avoided 54trying to assess the emotional value people
receive from tithing.1

A number of commentators have criticized the bankruptcy
courts for their unwillingness to consider such non-bankruptcy
goals.15 5

One has argued, "the burdens the Act imposes on

bankruptcy trustees are substantially outweighed by the policy goals
of protecting debtors' religious freedom and protecting churches
Although
from the hardship of disgorged contributions. "'5
bankruptcy courts may not violate the First Amendment in order to
effectuate bankruptcy policy, which most courts have held is not
violated in these cases," 7 constitutional concerns should not be the
IN See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd.

v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
Bruce W. Megard, Jr., Tithing and Fraudulent Transfers in Bankruptcy: Confirming a
Trustee's Power to Avoid the Tithe After City of Borne v. Flores, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 413, 419
(1997).
152
Richard Collin Mangrum, Tithing Bankruptcy and the Conflict Between Religious Freedom
and Creditor'sInterests, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 841 (1999).
153 Allard v. Hilton (In reChomakos), 170 B.R. 585, 593 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
I See In re Bloch, 207 B.R. 944; In re Newman, 183 B.R. 239; see also Megard, supra note
151; Mangrum, supra note 152.
1'
Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protectinga Bankruptcy
Debtor's Right to Tithe, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1223, 1225; Robert J. Bein, Comment, Robbing Peter to
Pay Paul: CharitableDonations and Fraudulent Transfers, 100 DICK. L. REv. 103 (1995); Steven
Hopkins, Comment, Is God a Preferred Creditor? Tithing as an Avoidable Transfer in Chapter 7
Bankruptcies, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1139 (1995).
IN Zywicki, supra note 155, at 1225.
See, e.g., In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 946 (holding fraudulent conveyance laws imposed no
151
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only reason courts refrain from using bankruptcy proceedings to
effectuate non-bankruptcy goals. Although supporting charitable
institutions is certainly a desirable objective, courts have been wise
in choosing to effectuate bankruptcy goals over such other societal
goals.
As the above two examples demonstrate, bankruptcy
proceedings often raise many non-bankruptcy concerns, and the
courts have had to decide how much weight to give these other
Although courts have been more receptive to
concerns.
effectuating environmental policy than charitable concerns, both
examples show the problems with trying to effectuate nonbankruptcy polices through bankruptcy proceedings. Such efforts
often require the sidelining of bankruptcy goals. Similar concerns
are raised when bankruptcy proceedings are used to effectuate gun
control. When courts make decisions about the exemptability of
firearms and allow considerations of the desirability of firearms to
factor into their decisions, the bankruptcy goal of giving debtors a
fresh start may be marginalized.
Courts wanting to increase gun control measures may be
unwilling, or at least less likely, to find firearms are necessary
household goods, even in cases where they clearly are, thereby
undermining a debtor's ability to get a fresh start. Conversely,
courts that are hostile to gun control may be too willing to find
firearms are necessary household goods, thereby undermining
The
creditors' ability to collect from the bankruptcy estate.
environmental and tithing bankruptcy examples demonstrate such
concerns are justified, and there is a need for clear congressional
guidance to prevent courts from making their own determinations
as to the desirability of firearms, especially at the expense of the
clear goals of bankruptcy.

substantial burden because "[slection 548 interferes minimally with the debtors' ability to
tithe," and "did not constrain the [d]ebtors' conduct nor their ability to express their
adherence to their faith"); In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251. The court held that although tithing
was a central tenet of the Newmans' religious practice, there was no evidence § 548 prevented
them from tithing because the Newmans had, in fact, paid the tithe. Id. "The statute, by its
own operation, does nothing to prevent the debtors' fulfillment of their personally held
religious obligation to tithe and, therefore, does not place a 'substantial burden' on the
debtors' practice of their religion." Id.
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CONCLUSION

The issue of gun control is hotly contested, and these
bankruptcy cases reflect the very real disagreement over the
importance of guns in our society. These opinions reveal a serious
lack of any systematic or coherent application of lien avoidance with
Lacking any meaningful guidance from
regard to firearms.
Congress on how they are supposed to apply the lien avoidance
provision of the Code to firearms, bankruptcy courts have begun
deciding these cases based on policy considerations regarding the
desirability of personal gun possession. Such considerations should
be left to Congress and not to the courts. When other policy
concerns are considered in bankruptcy proceedings, bankruptcy
goals have a tendency to become marginalized.
It may be true that guns are no longer necessary as a means of
obtaining food and are more likely to cause injury than provide
protection. Nevertheless, such determinations should not be made
in bankruptcy proceedings. The lack of congressional guidance on
this issue has lead to an untenable situation. Therefore, it is time
for Congress to provide more guidance regarding the meaning of
household goods in general, and on whether firearms meet this
definition in particular. Until then, courts should refrain from
letting their views on gun control affect their bankruptcy
determinations.

